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The Aftermath of the Lehman Brothers Collapse in Hong Kong:  
The Saga, Regulatory Deficiencies, and Government Responses 
 
Angus Young,1 Grace Li,2 and Tina Chu3 
Abstract: 
The paper examines the fallout of the Lehman Brothers collapse in Hong Kong. As an 
international financial hub in Asia, Hong Kong was profoundly affected by the 
collapse of this company. As a result, it impacted negatively on the public’s 
confidence in the Hong Kong’s banking sector. Furthermore, this event has exposed a 
number of regulatory deficiencies in Hong Kong. In response to this financial crisis, 
the Hong Kong government had made an unprecedented move to negotiate with local 
banks to refund the investors. In addition, the government has also sought public 
consultation on proposal to enhance the regulation of the sale of financial products. 
This paper argues that there needs to be amendments to the prevailing laws and the 
inclusions of legal rules to back up those proposed measures so that the disclosed 
information from the financial institution will not mislead the investors or 
misrepresent the products offered. 
 
Keywords: Financial crisis, regulatory reforms, disclosure, misleading information, 
misrepresentation  
 
1. Introduction 
The recent collapse of Lehman Brothers and its subsidiaries around the globe has 
attracted unprecedented amount of public controversy, leaving a large number of 
investors in despair, many of which have lost their entire life-savings. For much of 
2009, if you were living in Hong Kong you would have experienced frequent 
disruption to traffic in the financial districts at Central and Kowloon due to the daily 
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street protests by thousands of aggrieved investors. The newspapers and radio were 
inundated with distressing stories. At the extreme, there had even been reports of 
investors committing suicide. Evidently, this matter is of paramount importance to the 
integrity of island city’s financial system as well as the welfare of the residents of 
Hong Kong. 
 
In response to this financial crisis, the Hong Kong government by virtue of the 
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA) negotiated directly with the banks and financial institutions with limited 
success and mixed results. In addition, the SFC has drafted a proposal for public 
consultation endeavouring to rectify this regulatory shortfall by proposing a series of 
remedial measures to investors who suffered some great losses in so-called 
Minibond(s) investments.   
 
Nevertheless, the reputation of Hong Kong as an international financial hub in Asia 
had suffered after tens of thousands of investors who lost a great deal of money in this 
event. This collapse also exposed many weaknesses in the regulating the sale of 
investment products and snowballed into a crisis of public confidence. This calls for 
urgent attention by the government to restore the island city’s financial reputation. 
Moreover, the banking sector is one of the “four pillars” industries in Hong Kong and 
it is enshrined in Hong Kong’s Basic Law. Article 109 of the Hong Kong Basic Law 
stipulates, ‘[T]he Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall 
provide an appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the 
status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre.’4 Hence, the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in Hong Kong has passes beyond a matter of economic importance 
and became a matter with constitutional significance. 
 
This paper will explore both the regulatory deficiencies exposed as a result of the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the government reform efforts in Hong Kong. It is 
only through this route the article will proceed to highlight the problems and offer 
recommendations in law reform. The primary source consists of news articles in both 
English and Chinese, and reports from the financial regulators in Hong Kong.  
                                                        
4 Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
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In conclusion, this article will attest to the fact that free market requires not only 
robust laws to safeguard the vulnerable consumers, but also an appropriate 
mechanism to prevent crisis like Lehman Brothers from repeating again. It is 
therefore suggested that ‘fixing the problems’ requires a thorough investigation and a 
careful government response to ensure the root cause of this crisis is correctly 
addressed. One of those causes might be the failure of prevailing laws in Hong Kong 
to redress the grievances of the aggrieved Minibond investors. 
2.  An Attempt to decipher what is a ‘Minibond’  
In Hong Kong, ‘Minibonds’ (MB) (also known as High Notes) are credit-linked notes 
(CLNs). By definition, these CLNs are structured debt instruments under which 
payments of interest, principal or both are bundled as investment products. These 
financial products often offers relative good fixed rate of returns. Many of these MBs 
sold in Hong Kong were financial products developed and sold at wholesale level by 
Asian subsidiaries of Lehman Brothers in the US to many local banks and investment 
companies (referred to as reference entities), like HSBC, Hutchison Whampoa, DBS 
Group Holdings Ltd., Swire Pacific Ltd., Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd., Goldman 
Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley. Due to the reputation and good track records 
of these financial institutions, MBs were widely sold to the general public.  
 
The MBs are actually secured on collateral and swap arrangements with another 
Lehman subsidiary guaranteed by Lehman Holdings in the US. Funds raised were 
used to purchase collateral that was AAA rated at the time of purchase.5 However, 
what the investors might not appreciate is the complicity and risk associated with 
products is highly dependent on unsustainable economic ‘bubble’ in the US property 
markets.6  
 
                                                        
5  Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Issues raised by the Lehmans Minibonds crisis: Report 
to the Financial Secretary, December 2008’ 33 
<http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/general/general/lehman/Review%20Report/Review%20Report.pdf> at 
22nd September 2009. 
6  Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Issues raised by the Lehmans Minibonds crisis: Report 
to the Financial Secretary, December 2008’ 33 
<http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/general/general/lehman/Review%20Report/Review%20Report.pdf> at 
22nd September 2009. 
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Investors of MBs were exposed to the credit risks of the reference entities without 
directly holding the debt obligations of the reference entities and without involving 
any reference entity in the transaction.7 Accordingly, ‘[i]n event of the early 
redemption of the Minibonds/Notes, the recourse of the investors will be limited to 
the proceeds of realisation of the collateral (net of costs and expenses) plus or minus a 
swap termination amount.’8 Thus the associated risk can be high, especially to the 
ordinary investors who are not normally equipped with sufficient financial 
knowledge. However, MB offers payment of good interest and redemption payout at 
maturity.9 As such, the product was designed for sophisticated investors seeking 
exposure to high-grade assets that provide steady high returns.  
 
Nevertheless, the above attempt to explain what MBs are and the structure of such 
products has only been able to offer a limited insight to the highly complex 
investment product. For the layperson, things like ‘swaps’ and ‘debt-equity hybrids’ 
are terms that are almost incomprehensible, let alone to understand it. Therefore 
complexity of such an investment product should not be underscored. And with tens 
of thousands of elderly, retirees, and blue collar workers in Hong Kong investing in 
MBs, one could only speculate that their decisions to do so were either based on 
irrational judgements or faith in the viability of the US credit swaps markets. In fact, 
as revealed later in this events, many investors claimed that they were misled into 
believing MBs were some kind of term deposits (see subsequent paragraphs for 
details). In addition, from a regulatory perspective the challenge of regulating and 
keeping up with such complex financial instruments should not be underestimated.  
3. The Minibond Saga in Hong Kong 
In 2005, a Lehman Brothers subsidiary known as ‘Pacific International Finance 
Limited’ (PIF) started selling MBs in Hong Kong. MBs subsequently became a 
popular investment vehicle mainly because they receive higher yields than other term 
                                                        
7  http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/chi/press/2008_f.htm. Note that the securitisation of the debt is 
not direct. They are made up of bundled collaterals under swap arrangements through 3rd parties.    
8  Hong Kong Monetary Authority, ‘Report of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority on Issues 
Concerning the Distribution of Structured products Connected to Lehman Group Companies’, 16 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/new/lehman/lehman_report.pdf> at 21st September 2009. 
9  Hong Kong Monetary Authority, ‘Report of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority on Issues 
Concerning the Distribution of Structured products Connected to Lehman Group Companies’, 3 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/new/lehman/lehman_report.pdf> at 20th September 2009.  
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deposit products. They were sold in Hong Kong through a total of 20 banks and 3 
brokers.10 Amongst the many distributors of MBs, the Bank of China (Hong Kong) 
became the biggest retailer, accounting for some 30-40% of the total sales.11 
According to statistics by the SFC, Lehman Brothers-related MB sales in Hong Kong 
reached approximately HK$12.7 billion by 2008. This is a significant figure 
representing one third of the structured note12 market share in Hong Kong.13  
 
On the 15th September 2008, the Leman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy 
in the US under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 14 Several Lehman 
Brothers subsidiaries in Hong Kong were put into liquidation shortly afterwards.15 
This marked the end of the MBs’ high returns and a beginning of the crisis to come.  
 
On September 23, 2008, a week after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, 
hundreds of Hong Kong investors gathered in front of Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority’s building to protest. Many of the investors’ stories were similar: they 
bought these financial products (MBs) when their term deposits matured, because the 
banks in Hong Kong promoted MBs as an alternative investment product, analogous 
to ‘a high return term deposit’.  
 
                                                        
10  Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Issues raised by the Lehmans Minibonds crisis: Report 
to the Financial Secretary, December 2008’ 29 
<http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/general/general/lehman/Review%20Report/Review%20Report.pdf> at 
22nd September 2009.  
11  The total investment sold by BOCHK was between HKD$3.7 billion to HKD$5 billion.  
12  A Structured note normally refers to the structured security. U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Rule 434 (regarding certain prospectus deliveries) defines structured securities as 
"securities whose cash flow characteristics depend upon one or more indices or that have embedded 
forwards or options or securities where an investor's investment return and the issuer's payment 
obligations are contingent on, or highly sensitive to, changes in the value of underlying assets, indices, 
interest rates or cash flows." In addition, the Pacific Stock Exchange defines structured products as 
"products that are derived from and/or based on a single security or securities, a basket of stocks, an 
index, a commodity, debt issuance and/or a foreign currency, among other things" and include "index 
and equity linked notes, term notes and units generally consisting of a contract to purchase equity 
and/or debt securities at a specific time." 
13  According to SFC, minibond market in HK was about HKD$36 billion, in which, Lehman 
Bros related minibond was about HKD$12.7 billion.  
14  Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Issues raised by the Lehmans Minibonds crisis: Report 
to the Financial Secretary, December 2008’ 28 
<http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/general/general/lehman/Review%20Report/Review%20Report.pdf> at 
22nd September 2009.  
15  Hong Kong Monetary Authority, ‘Report of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority on Issues 
Concerning the Distribution of Structured products Connected to Lehman Group Companies’, 7 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/new/lehman/lehman_report.pdf> at 21st September 2009. 
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For example, the banks marketed the sale of MBs by the use of glossy posters and 
mini-flyers with promotional material that clearly specified: ‘[t]his product is 
designed for a term of 3 years. The interest rate is a fixed rate of 5.5%. Interest is paid 
every quarter. Seven blue chip banks are jointly offering this product…[i]f your 
application is successful, you will also take home for free: a 46 inch LCD TV, a high 
quality digital video camera with Sony hard disc, Panasonic digital camera, cash back 
and gift card…’.16 Naturally such advertisement attracted lots of interest from the 
public. When the Lehman Brothers collapse, the local media was flooded with 
allegations that reputable local banks had preyed on vulnerable, elderly and ignorant 
members of the public to invest in MBs. Mr. Guangyu Chen a retiree told the local 
media that, ‘[I] have always trusted our Hong Kong banks. I grew up in Hong Kong. I 
thought Hong Kong is a major financial centre of the world. But this thinking had 
made me penniless!’17 Consistently, the crux of these complaints was that customers’ 
intention to invest in term deposits had been deflected by the banks towards investing 
in MBs.18 In accordance with advice received from the banks, investors mistakenly 
believed they had lodged their money in a ‘safe’, ‘high-yield’, 3-year term deposit. 
Yet, many investors were elderly with limited education, and were unable to 
comprehend the complexities of MBs. They complained that bank staff never told 
them about the risk in investing in MBs, only articulating that the investment product 
was issued by a large international company with a good track record. In many 
events, even the name of Lehman Brothers was never mentioned.19   
 
Typical of the complaints was the experience recounted by Mr You, a 65 year old 
married man who invested his lifesavings of HK$1.7million in MBs. Mr You 
recounted:    
I started to buy Lehman Bros minibonds from November 2006. My intention 
had been to put all my savings into term deposits for a safe return. However, 
bank staff introduced the minibond to me. They said this is very similar to a 
term deposit, but the interest rate is much higher, 6% interest rate in the first 6 
                                                        
16  Tse, W. Y. (2009). The Banks' Responses to Their Minibond Allegation. Hong Kong 
Financial and Economic News. Hong Kong: 3. 
17  Ar, R. (2009). "After Lehman Brothers Scandel." Retrieved 12 Sept., 2009, from 
http://www.cenet.org.cn/article.asp?articleid=38386. 
18  H Wang, ‘Minibond Crisis in Hong Kong: the Stories Behind’, Nan Fang Weekend News, 
P3-4. 
19  Ibid. 
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years and the risk is basically nothing. How could I understand all these 
financial products? I trusted the bank and put my savings of my entire life in 
it…20  
On September 16, 2008, the bank notified Mr. You that he would probably recover 
nothing from his investment. 
 
Another example, Yu Lia Chun is a retired orderly with only a sixth-grade education 
in HK. She said she thought her money was in a savings account. She did not know 
she had bought minibonds from Lehman brothers. When Lehman Brothers collapsed 
she lost her entire nest egg of HK$1.2 million. She said ‘[t]here is no way a person 
like me could understand any of this…’ Sun Kwan a 58-year-old retired parks worker 
who bought MBs from the Bank of China (BOC). For several days, he stood outside 
the Hong Kong headquarters of the BOC along with Yu and 51 other protesters, 
banging a chipped red drum with a stick under the hot sun and rain with a sign around 
his neck, hand-lettered in Chinese characters, read: “The Bank of China is a hooker. 
Give me back my money earned with blood and sweat.” Sun, who has a high school 
education, invested about HK$285,000 in MBs, sold to him by BOC Hong Kong, 
which paid about 4 percent interest a year. He said he thought he was putting his 
money into a certificate of deposit. Sun and Yu like many other elderly people did not 
understand the prospectus and was persuaded by bank staffs to invest in a safe high 
yield products in which they had no understanding of. 21  
 
Other investors complained they never received information from the banks about 
their investments in MBs post-Lehman Brothers collapse. Rather, they only heard 
about their fate from newspapers or friends. Those banks that did notify investors 
only indicated that were issues with the MB investment without giving detailed 
information. Thus, during the many (almost daily at one stage) protests, investors 
displayed signs saying ‘Cheating Bank’ and ‘Dodgy Bank’ on the streets of Hong 
                                                        
20  Wang, L. (2009). "There Must Be A Way to Save Us - An Report of the Social Impact in 
Hong Kong on the  Collapse of Lehman Bros." Retrieved 7 Sept., 2009, from 
http://www.hkreporter.com/talks/viewthread.php?tid=249320. 
21  Mark Pittman and Bob Ivry, ‘London Suicide Connects Lehman Lesson Missed by Hong 
Kong Woman’ Bloomberg News, 9 September 2009, < 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601170&sid=aNFuVRL73wJc#> at 25 November 2009.  
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Kong.22 Thus, if the banks did act in the manner reported by the media, it would 
certainly be against good conscience and natural justice. Against this background, this 
paper proceeds to explore what the government has done and the legal issues. 
4. Responses from the Hong Kong Government 
As noted earlier, there were huge daily public protests. The media was inundated with 
calls from grieved investors to call for the resignation of senior government officials 
and the Chief Executive of the HK government. In response, the Legislative Council 
invoke a rare power to launch a special committee to investigate the MB scandal. On 
October 22, 2008, a member of Hong Kong Legislative Council, Mr. Jianfeng Lin 
brought a motion to the Council suggesting five immediate steps to be taken to deal 
with the Lehman Brothers crisis:23  
1. Create a special cross-sector working group to advise MB investors in Lehman 
Brothers and related products;  
2. Complete the investigation into the MB scandal in a shortest possible time. If 
misconduct is found, to help investors to recover their investments;  
3. Provide full support for investigations to be initiated by the HK Consumer 
Council. If it is necessary, help small investors by funding their legal actions 
via the Council special litigation grant;    
4. Ensure that the government contact the banks and financial institutions on the 
behalf of small personal investors to negotiate a settlement;  
5. That the SFC and HKMA undertake comprehensive investigation as to 
whether there were oversights in their own organisations in relation to the 
handling of MB and related products. 
 
In an unusual sign of unity, the Legislative Council overwhelmingly supported this 
motion with a few minor amendments.24 The fact that the Legislative Council 
responded so swiftly to this case, within one month after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, demonstrated the scale and depth of this problem. 
 
                                                        
22  http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2009-07/15/content_18138305.htm 
23  http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/chinese/counmtg/motion/mot_0809.htm#081022 
24   http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/chinese/counmtg/motion/mot_0809.htm#081022 
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Furthermore, in response to the unprecedented public fallout of the Lehman Brothers 
scandal, the Hong Kong government set up a complaint procedure for investors of 
MBs and related products. They were asked to lodge a formal complaint with the 
HKMA. Then the complaints were then passed to the SFC for investigation.  
 
According to a SFC report submitted to the HK government in late 2008, it 
categorized majority of the complaints about the MBs under three headings25  
 
More particularly, the five most common allegations against banks who promoted 
MBs were that their front line staff:26  
(a) proactively induced the complainants to turn their matured fixed deposits 
into investments in Lehman-related products for higher returns and other 
incentives such as free shopping coupons; 
(b) failed to consider the complainants’ risk profile and personal 
circumstances when selling products. This was particularly evident with 
respect to the retired, elderly, less-educated, less-sophisticated, and risk-
averse clients;  
(c) did not provide product information by ways of term sheets [terms and 
conditions of the contract] and prospectuses. Nor did staff explain product 
features and risks at the point of sale. Some even misrepresented that the 
products, especially MBs, were risk-free, and analogous to fixed deposits; 
(d) only highlighted the well-known reference entities [Lehman Brothers in 
the US, or in many cases customers where told is a very reputable US 
bank] of MBs, emphasizing that the risk of MBs was only tied to the credit 
risk of these reference entities without mentioning the role of and the risk 
associated with Lehman Holdings; and; 
                                                        
25 Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Issues raised by the Lehmans Minibonds crisis: Report to the 
Financial Secretary, December 2008’ 2 
<http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/general/general/lehman/Review%20Report/Review%20Report.pdf> at 
22nd September 2009. 
26  Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Issues raised by the Lehmans Minibonds crisis: Report 
to the Financial Secretary, December 2008’ 35 
<http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/general/general/lehman/Review%20Report/Review%20Report.pdf> at 
22nd September 2009.  
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(e) That banks did not respond to complainants’ enquiries and complaints 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
 
Also, in a legislative context, it is commendable to note that the HK government has 
instilled further effort to enhance the power of its financial services regulations. The 
government’s attempt includes a report released by the HKMA in early 2009 stating 
that the regulators [SFC and HKMA], could instigate disciplinary actions against the 
banks and their staffs for serious breach of banking licence requirements. However, 
on the flip side, they do not have the power to order the institutions to pay 
compensation to the investor.27 The relative inability of Hong Kong regulators to 
prosecute banks in the MBs saga remained the major cause of the huge public 
outcries. 
 
Following ten months of street protests, investigations by SFC and HKMA, and 
committee hearings where senior banks officials testified before the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, and negotiations by the SFC on behalf of investors, on July 22, 
2009, the Hong Kong banks in a rare and unprecedented move agreed to contribute 
more than HKD$6 billion to buy back Lehman Brothers’ MBs.28 In the negotiated 
settlement the Hong Kong banks agreed to pay a price equivalent to 60 percent of the 
principal of the original investment for investors below the age of 65, and 70 percent 
for those aged 65 or above. In addition, investors could retain any payments already 
received. In addition, the banks also agreed that once they have recovered underlying 
collateral, each of them would make further payments to investors below the age of 
65, initially up to 10 percent of the principal of the MBs. And if recoveries exceed 70 
percent, the banks will pay the entire excess amount to those who have accepted the 
offer, which could take some of the settlements to 100 percent. Finally, a requirement 
of the settlement is that the Hong Kong banks need to inform their customers about 
the offer in an expeditious manner and deposit the funds in the customers’ accounts 
within 30 days of the offer being accepted. However, professional investors, including 
                                                        
27  Hong Kong Monetary Authority, ‘Report of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority on Issues 
Concerning the Distribution of Structured products Connected to Lehman Group Companies’, 42 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/new/lehman/lehman_report.pdf> at 21st September 2009. 
28  
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=30&art_id=85271&sid=24667606&con_type
=1  
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non-individual and experienced investors, are not covered by this settlement.29 
Although the issue of professional investors remains unsettled, at least the small 
personal investors look set to recover the majority of their original investments.30 
 
The chief executive of the SFC has indicated that the settlements will, ‘[p]rovide 
substantial benefits for the vast majority of customers holding minibonds that would 
not otherwise be received by them’, and described the deal as a ‘good compromise’.31 
The secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Ceajer Chan Ka-keung has 
added that, ‘[t]hose accepting the offers will be relieved of the delay and uncertainty 
in going through the liquidation processes.’32 
 
According to the Bank of China (Hong Kong), one month after the settlement was 
announced, it had received replies from more than 60 percent of MB investors, with 
almost all accepting the offer of reimbursement of 60 to 70 percent of their original 
investment.33  
 
Whilst this has provided relief for some of the aggrieved MB investors, it does not 
address the important issue of legal recourse. Or address the issue of whether the 
prevailing laws are adequate in dealing with the nature of the potential claims. 
5. Possible Legal Recourse for MB investors 
This article argues that there are potentially three avenues of legal actions that an 
aggrieved investor in Hong Kong can pursue to recover damages from the bank or 
financial institution for misleading and deceptive conducts in selling of MBs. These 
include:  
(i) by the contravention of prospectus provisions under Companies 
Ordinance;  
                                                        
29  NG, J. (2009). "Banks to Buy Back Lehman Minibonds, the Wall Street Journal," from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124825602525271653.html. 
30  Wang, J. G. (2009). Lehman Minibond Scandle and Its Lessons for the Mainland. China 
Daily. Beijing: 2. 
31  http://stock.cnnb.com.cn/content/channel/tglj/c161/2009/0723/693200340.shtml 
32  Wang, J. G. (2009). Lehman Minibond Scandle and Its Lessons for the Mainland. China 
Daily. Beijing: 2. 
33
 http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_cat=11&art_id=87034&sid=25173514&
con_type=1&d_str=20090828&fc=8 
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(ii) by misrepresentation under general law and the Misrepresentation 
Ordinance; and 
(iii)  by unconscionable conduct under the Unconscionable Contracts 
Ordinance 
All three avenues of legal recourse are attempted below.  
 
(i) Prospectuses 
As discussed, MBs were credit-linked financial products. As such, they were a special 
type of security and in common with securities generally, the issuer maybe under 
legal obligation to make appropriate disclosure. In accordance with section 2 of the 
Companies Ordinance (CO) disclosure is made by way of a prospectus. The latter is 
described in section 2 as a document that contains information relating to shares or 
debentures offered to the public. The disclosure requirements for prospectuses are set 
out in section 38, CO. Exceptions from prospectus34 in connection with an offer as 
prescribed in Part 1 of the Seventeenth Schedule can be excluded from the prospectus 
requirement by virtue of section 38A CO.35 Furthermore, there are exclusions of 
offers that do not fall within the definition of prospectus. As such would be treated as 
exemptions. They can be found under Part 3 of the Eighteenth Schedule in CO. 36  
                                                        
34   Definition of Prospectus- section 2 CO- means any prospectus, notice, circular, brochure, 
advertisement, or other document offering shares or debentures of a company. 
35 There are 12 types of offers which are exempted from issuing a prospectus: 35 
(i) An offer to professional investors;35 
(ii) An offer to less than 50 people; 
(iii)  An offer in which the total consideration payable for the shares and debentures do not 
exceed HK$5m; 
(iv) An offer of which the minimum consideration payable for the shares or debentures is not 
less than HK$5m; 
(v) An offer in connection with an invitation to enter into an underwriting agreement; 
(vi) An offer in connection with a takeover or merger or a share repurchase in compliance 
with the relevant codes;35 
(vii) An offer of shares in as bonus shares or dividend shares to current shareholders; 
(viii)  An offer of shares or debentures to a current or former director, employee, officer, 
consultant and their spouses and dependents or trustees of any of the above persons; 
(ix)  An offer of shares of a charitable institution; 
(x) An offer of shares to members of a club or association; 
(xi) An exchange of shares or debentures of the same company not resulting in increase of 
capital; and 
(xii) An offer in connection with a authorised collective investment scheme with authorised 
invitation and advertisements by the SFO. 
36   Examples of these exemptions in Part 3 of the Eighteenth Schedule in CO include, offers 
are aimed at professional investors; offers made to fewer than 50 persons; offers where the 
amount raised does not exceed HKD$5 million and is accompanied by a statement of warning; or 
offers where the minimum denomination or consideration is not less than HKD$500,000.  
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The guiding principle to the contents of a prospectus is to “allow investors to make an 
informed assessment of the activities of the issuer, its assets and liabilities, its 
financial position, its management and prospects, its profits and losses and the rights 
of the shares it offers”37. Therefore the law imposes civil liability under section 40 of 
CO38 for untrue statements, which includes a material omission from the 
prospectus.39 This provision makes a number of persons liable for untrue 
statements,40 these include all directors and promoters of the company, as well as 
persons are authorised the issue of the prospectus.41 
 
Whilst the law is clear about liability of ‘untrue statements’ in prospectus, it did not 
make clear distinction between fact and opinion, which is an essential element to 
define the nature of the statements provided. Moreover, economic analysis in 
prospectus are based on many assumptions about the rate of returns from the 
investments, it would be difficult to prove on balance of probabilities the projections 
are unrealistic or half truths and is thus untrue unless the law makes clear the 
truthfulness of the statement must be based on reasonable premises and not over 
inflated expectations.42   
 
Since section 40 of the CO remains untested as there are no cases on untrue 
statements in prospectus,43 it would be difficult to give an opinion if the investors of 
MBs could successful mount a challenge against the banks and financial institution 
                                                        
37   Paul Kwan p439 
38   Note that section 40 and 40A, CO contains both civil and criminal penalties as well as 
defences for misstatements in prospectus. For the purpose of this article, only civil liabilities will 
be discussed. 
39   Section 41A CO 
40   See section 40(7) CO 
41  Paul Kwan p 456. Defences are available under section 40(2) and (3) of CO to a director and 
expert respectively, who authorises the issue of the prospectus containing an untrue statement, if he- 
(a) Withdraws his consent before delivery of the prospectus for registration; 
(b) Gives reasonable notice to withdraw his consent between registration of the prospectus and 
any allotment under it; or 
(c) That he is competent and believes on reasonable grounds that the statement is true. 
42  Frank Clarke and Graeme Dean, Indecent Disclosure: Gilding the Corporate Lily (2007) 14‐
32 
43  However, note that in the recent administrative appeal case of Chiang Lily v Secretary for 
Justice [2009] HKCU 230, section 40 of CO was considered in relation to a legal for misleading 
statements in a prospectus. It is anticipated that a trial on this issue will be hear before the High Court 
later this year.  
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even they have found questionable statements in the prospectus. Alternatively, even if 
the MB investors could commence legal action under general law, it might not be a 
viable option because plaintiffs have to prove that they have relied on the 
representation and statements in the prospectus to purchase the MBs,44 not to mention 
the difficulties as discussed in the above, associated with proving the untrueness of 
statements. 
 
Another avenue for MB investors would be making a claim under disclosure of false 
or misleading information inducing transactions under section 277 of Securities and 
Futures Ordinance (SFO), this falls under market misconduct. The meaning of this 
provision also cover parties who engage in, or assisting, counselling or procuring 
another person to engage in, any conduct of disclosure of false or misleading 
information inducing transactions within the meaning of section 277.45 But to prove 
this, the person or the body corporate (banks) selling the MB must know, or is 
reckless / negligent as to whether the information is false or misleading as to the 
material fact, or through omission of a material fact. 46  The burden of proof is 
substantial. Also the seller of MB might not be held accountable for disclosing false 
or misleading information if they were merely reproducing information provided by 
third party.47  
 
While this paper is not suggesting that disclosure is an ineffective regulatory 
mechanism, we simply making the case that for some types of securities, disclosure 
through prospectuses might not be well suited for retail investors, due to the fact that 
                                                        
44   See Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605,  
45   Section 245 SFO 
46   Paul Kwan, p 459 
47  Section 277 (2) SFO states, “A person shall not be regarded as having engaged in market  
misconduct by reason of disclosure of false or misleading information inducing transactions if the 
disclosure has taken place by reason only of the issue or reproduction of the information and he 
establishes that- 
 (a)  the issue or reproduction of the information took place in the ordinary 
course of a business (whether or not carried on by him), the principal purpose of which was 
issuing or reproducing materials provided by others; (b)  the contents of the information 
were not, wholly or partly, devised- (i)    where the business was carried on by him, by 
himself or any officer, employee or agent of his; or (ii)   where the business was not carried 
on by him, by himself; (c)  for the purposes of the issue or reproduction- (i)    where the 
business was carried on by him, he or any officer, employee or agent of his; or (ii) where 
the business was not carried on by him, he, did not  select, add to, modify or otherwise 
exercise control over the contents of the information; and (d)  at the time of the issue or 
reproduction, he did not know that the information was false or misleading as to a material 
fact or was false or misleading through the omission of a material fact”. 
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these investors are laypersons and consequently not familiar with technical financial 
terms or analysis. The complexity of the information on MBs was one of the most 
common complaints that the SFC had received from MB investors.48 Therefore, it is 
unlikely MB investors could succeed making claims under section 40 of CO or 
section 277 of SFO if they fail to understand the information provided in the 
prospectus. 
 
(ii) Misrepresentation 
Under general law aggrieved investors could bring actions for misrepresentation, 
whether the misrepresentation is fraudulent, innocent and/or negligent.49 To qualify 
for misrepresentation, the statement of conduct has to be one of fact, not of law. Also, 
the plaintiff has to rely on the representor’s statement or conduct.  
 
Misrepresentation is “an untrue statement of fact made by one party to the other in the 
course of negotiating a contract that induces the other party to enter into the 
contract.”50 It is “representation which does not accord with the true facts (past or 
present).”51 So for the MB investor, he/she is required to proof the following 
elements: 
 False factual statement 
 Reliance by one party 
 Materiality 
 
The plaintiff must proof that the statement is in fact untrue. The untrue nature of a 
statement is distinguished from future promises, mere pufferies, statements of 
intention and opinion. However, (mis)representation can be implied silently without 
words by conduct, such as a nod or a wink, a shake of the head, smile intended to 
induce. 52 Next, the reliance by the representee (MB investor) must be intended by the 
representor (the bank) when the (mis) representation is made. Reliance often refers to 
                                                        
48   Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Issues raised by the Lehmans Minibonds crisis: 
Report to the Financial Secretary, December 2008’ 2 
<http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/general/general/lehman/Review%20Report/Review%20Repo
rt.pdf> at 22nd September 2009. 
49  Lawrence Ma, Equity and Trust Law in Hong Kong (2006) 157. 
50   OUP, Oxford Dictionary of Law (2001) at p.317 
51    Carter, Penden & Tolhurst‐ Contracts Law in Australia 5th ed. P. 369 
52   See Walters v Morgan (1861) 3 De GF & J 718 at 724. 
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the vulnerability of the representee, that the representor holds more knowledge in a 
contractual situation. To satisfy this element of reliance, the representee must have 
been induced into signing the contract, and subsequently suffered a loss or damage. 
This is a question of fact which the “representation must be shown to have reached 
and misled the mind of the person taking the decision to contract”53. Besides, non-
disclosure of non-material facts does not constitute misrepresentation54. Therefore, 
the statement or conduct of the facts relied upon must be of significance, that is of 
materiality.55 
 
Misrepresentations Ordinance (MO) attempts to broaden the scope of liability in a 
non-fraudulent situation and the right to award damages in lieu of rescission.56 It is 
not possible to contract out of the entire Ordinance.57 Then again, section 2 only 
covers the ‘terms of the contract’58.  
 
Section 3 of the MO implies conduct of misrepresentation limited to negotiations 
before the signing of contract. In the case of Aktieselskabet, the court affirmed that 
“when a representation had been made but with some essential qualification or 
modification omitted, without the inclusion of which the original statement became 
untrue, the maker of the representation was guilty of misrepresentation by 
omission”.59 And added that “…if this occurs during negotiation, the party with 
knowledge is required to speak and correct the mistaken belief of the other party as 
created by earlier statements”. 60  
 
In Long Year Development Ltd v Tse Fuk Man Norman,61 Deputy Judge Li [Court of 
First Instance] held that third parties have to prove they had reasonable grounds to 
                                                        
53   Carter, Penden & Tolhurst‐ Contracts Law in Australia 5th ed. P.376; Also see Macleay v 
Tait [1906] AC 24; A‐G New South Wales v Peters (124) 23 CLR 146.  
54   See Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597; W Scott Fell & Co v Lloyd (1906) 4 CLR 572; 
United Dominions Corp Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR1 at 5‐6. 
55   Saunders v Queensland Insurance [1931] HCA 42 
56   Section 2, Misrepresentation Ordinance. 
57   Lawrence Ma, Equity and Trust Law in Hong Kong (2006) 158. 
58   Misrepresentation Ordinance  
59   Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Wheelock Marden & Co Ltd [1998] 3 HKC 153 at 
pp164 E‐F.  
60  Ibid at pp 164F‐G. 
61   Long Year Development Ltd v Tse Fuk Man Norman [1991] HKCFI 186; 
HCA003959/1989, Paras. 53 and 54. 
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believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made that the facts represented 
were true, casual observation on one occasion on a matter which could easily be 
ascertained and verified from the title documents does not constitute a reasonable 
ground, the defendant was still liable under section 3 (1) of MO.62  
 
Extending by analogy to the aggrieved MB investors in Hong Kong, the banks and 
intermediaries have an obligation to disclose material facts of associated high risks 
and potential losses suffered as it substantially affects the purchase decision of the 
investors. SFC also noted in a report to the HK government that they received 87 
complaints about misrepresentation by bank staff to MB investors.63 Much of which 
could be categorised into two main issues: 1. Distributors of MB misrepresented MB 
as low risk products and, 2. Distributors did not disclosure the role of Lehman 
Brothers.64 The aggrieved MB investors could pursue legal action under 
misrepresentation. 
 
Then again, it is difficult to take a view at this stage, the possibility of success for MB 
investors to pursue the banks for misrepresentation from media reports and 
complaints received by SFC. It could be that the investors did not bother to study the 
facts before purchasing the MBs, or that their decisions were motivated by the 
conduct of bank staffs rather than the facts given the prospectus. As a defence, the 
bank staffs could claim that when the statement was made to the client, he / she 
believed on reasonable grounds that the statement was true, or that he / she relied on 
the statements from MB provider and had no reason to doubt it was not true. On the 
issue of whether the MB investors would not have bought an investment product if 
they had known it was by the Lehman Brothers remains speculative. 
 
In a nutshell, misrepresentation is an untrue statement. This is a question of fact, not a 
casual observation. It covers omission during negotiation and the need to clarify any 
mistaken or erroneous beliefs with respect to the contract. MO might have broadened 
                                                        
62   [1991] HKCFI 186; HCA003959/1989 
63   Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Issues raised by the Lehmans Minibonds crisis: 
Report to the Financial Secretary, December 2008’ 36 
<http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/general/general/lehman/Review%20Report/Review%20Repo
rt.pdf> at 22nd September 2009. 
64   Ibid. 
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the scope and remedies of general law obligations, but the statutory obligations did 
not take into account special disability or vulnerability of plaintiffs. Nor does it 
address the issue of conduct leading the plaintiff to erroneous interpretation of facts. 
The narrowness of the ordinance needs to capture misleading or deceptive conduct. 
 
(iii)  Unconscionable Contracts 
The Unconscionable Contracts Ordinance (UCO) deal with special disability or 
vulnerabilities not covered under MO. UCO provides statutory recourse dealing with 
the contracts of sale of goods or provisions of services to consumers. Section 5 of the 
UCO empowers the court to give relief in such contracts as it find unconscionable, 
provided that the contract was entered into prior to 1994. In exercising its powers, the 
court may refuse to enforce the contract; enforce the remainder of the contract after 
omitting the unconscionable part(s);and /or revise or alter the application of any 
unconscionable parts of the contracts. 
 
Unconscionability refers to a number of things including, “unfairness, injustice, and 
unreasonable or excessive conduct against the conscience as recognised by equity”.65 
In determining unconscionability the court would consider the following:66 
(a) The relative strengths of the bargaining positions of both parties; 
(b) Whether unreasonable provisions in the nature of penalising the consumer 
exist;  
(c) Whether the document containing terms of supply or service is 
comprehensive;  
(d) Whether any pressure was exerted on or any unfair tactics were used against 
the consumer; and 
(e) Whether the amount charged for the supply of goods or services exceeds the 
usual or market rate at that time.  
 
The concept of unconscionability is subjective in the eyes of the court with the notion 
of “fairness” and “justice”. The equity principle of unconscionability co-exists with 
other contractual obligations. As Finn has pointed out, the gist of the conscience of 
                                                        
65   Lawrence Ma, Equity and Trust Law in Hong Kong (2006) 148. 
66   Section 6 of the UCO, and Lawrence Ma, Equity and Trust Law in Hong Kong (2006) 153. 
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equity has two central concerns - the first is the protection of the vulnerable and the 
second is the protection of people’s reasonable expectations.67 
 
In a tribunal appeal case of Shum Kit Ching v Caesar Beauty Centre Ltd 68, the 
appellant, Shum had entered into a beauty therapy VIP membership worth $48,060 
and attempted to withdraw from performance of the contract on the following day but 
failed. The appeal was brought subsequent to the first instance decision to dismiss the 
complaint based on misdirection of law. Shum’s counsel submitted that her weakness 
was easily persuaded into spending money without understanding of the contract, but 
the Recorder Chan held that this in itself is insufficient to constitute to render the 
contract unconscionable. And he added that,  
[U]nconscionable as meaning 'wholly unreasonable, not guided or restrained 
by conscience'. Certainly there is an element of lack of conscience before one 
can say that that thing is unconscionable and it is difficult to see how a 
person's conscience could be affected by things that he does not know. 
Accordingly in the context of s 5 of the Ordinance [UCO], it is difficult to 
envisage a situation where the party against whom relief is sought not 
knowing the points of weakness of the other party and not exploiting the 
points of weakness of the other party to induce the other party to enter into the 
contract, could nevertheless produce a result that the contract entered into be 
properly described as unconscionable.69 
 
Thus legal action on the grounds of unconscionability requires more than mere 
weakness or that the plaintiff was easily persuaded to sign a contract. If the consumer 
alleges unconscionability he / she bear the onus of proof.70 There are three elements 
required:71 1. The consumer was suffering from some kind of disability or 
disadvantage; 2. The transaction was unfair and oppressive and; 3. The defendant 
exploited the weaknesses of the plaintiff. Furthermore, in order to seek relief under 
                                                        
67    Finn, P “Unconscionable Conduct” (1994) 8 Journal of Contract Law 37. 
68   [2003] 3 HKC 235 
69    Ibid at para 13. 
70   Lawrence Ma, Equity and Trust Law in Hong Kong (2006) 153. 
71   Ibid, 148. 
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unconscionability, the plaintiff must also proof that there is no improper acts on their 
behalf. 72  
 
In a rejoinder to the MB investors in Hong Kong, for them to sue the banks under 
UCO, they have to prove the above elements. Whilst the media had reported that there 
were many vulnerable elderly who were duped to invest in MBs, out of the three 
elements needed to sustain this legal action, proving the second and third elements 
might not be as straightforward as one might think. Besides, in Shum case in the 
above, it was held mere weakness in itself did not constitute unconscionable.  
 
Thus far the discussions about the three possible avenues of legal recourse for 
aggrieved MB investors have demonstrated some difficulties and hurdles that 
plaintiffs have to overcome in order to sustain legal actions against the banks and 
financial institutions in seeking compensation. This could explain why the MB 
investors had to resort to street protest rather than legal action.  
 
To date there has only been one reported court action brought by investors of the 
MBs. It commenced in the Hong Kong district court in late 2009. According to the 
Hong Kong Standard73 the current case involves a nurse, Chan Mei-ying who is suing 
Citibank on the grounds that it misrepresented the nature and risk of MBs. In the writ 
filed with the District Court, Chan alleged that bank staff told her the product was 
very similar to a fixed deposit, with a yearly interest of about 4 percent.74 In the wake 
of the Lehman Brothers collapse, Chan claims to have lost her investment of 
HKD$500,000. 
 
The Hong Kong Standard also reported that in 2008 Citibank completed a risk profile 
on Chan’s behalf. She was classified as an "active and experienced investor" with 
"aggressive" investment objectives and high risk tolerance. But Chan alleged that one 
                                                        
72   Meyers v Casey (1913) 17 CLR 90 at 124 per Issacs J.  
73   For full article see Patsy Moy, ‘Lehman investor to get her day in court’ (The Hong Kong 
Standard, 25th September 2009) 
<http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=30&art_id=88391&sid=25487561&c
on_type=1#> at 25 September 2009. 
74   Patsy Moy, ‘Lehman investor to get her day in court’ (The Hong Kong Standard, 25th 
September 2009) 
<http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=30&art_id=88391&sid=25487561&c
on_type=1#> at 25 September 2009.  
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of the Citibank relationship managers who dealt with her account listed her 
investment preferences as "low" to "moderate" in risk levels. In addition, Chan 
claimed that she considered Lau and Yee another Citibank relationship manager, to be 
her investment advisers. Indeed, from time to time both had recommended 
investments that Chan acquired. In January 2008, Lau told Chan that the term on her 
fixed deposit of HKD$400,000 had expired and invited her to discuss her investment 
plan. Chan said she met Lau and persuaded her to subscribe to a Lehman equity-
linked note [MB]. Chan invested her entire savings of HK$500,000 in the MB. Chan 
further claimed that she was not told the nature of the risk involved with the product. 
Rather, she was advised that she would lose "a good opportunity" if she did not 
subscribe before the deadline. On September 15 2008, Chan said she was shocked to 
discover the huge loss when Lau contacted her to advise that the note was negative in 
value owing to the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Chan is suing Citibank of a breach 
of duty and is claiming damages, interest and costs.75    
 
Until the case has been decided, it would be unwise to accuse either party of any 
wrong doing. Nevertheless from the above allegations, it is easy to appreciate why 
legal actions could be difficult – the context and the actual words used to represent of 
the contract is open to challenge. Besides, there is no mention of whether or not the 
plaintiff has a copy of the prospectus or that she had read it.  
 
Rather than criticising the scope and robustness of each ordinance, the answer is 
perhaps to reform these laws in a integrative and coherent them manner, to broaden 
the scope of the regulation, as well as raising the standards as to reducing chances of 
repeating MB incident. Even if there might be a high cost in complying with a higher 
standard, there will be a better dividend for both the financial sector as a whole, not to 
mention that the investors would be more inspired by greater confidence in both the 
financial product offered and services provided. This is a matter of legal reforms 
which the government has to address. 
                                                        
75 Patsy Moy, ‘Lehman investor to get her day in court’ (The Hong Kong Standard, 25th September 
2009) 
<http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=30&art_id=88391&sid=25487561&c
on_type=1#> at 25 September 2009.  
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6   Proposals by the Hong Kong government 
Taken as a whole, the MB crisis indicates that the regulating financial products and 
service in Hong Kong have two obvious gaps: first, the way in which information is 
disclosed to investors; and second, the provisions of in CO, MO and UCO lacks 
‘depth’ and ‘breathe’.76  
 
In September 2009, the SFC produced a considerable large publication titled – 
‘Consultation Paper on Proposals to Enhance Protection of the Investing Public’. In 
the executive summary of this consultation paper states: 
 
[T]he stress put on our financial infrastructure and in particular the direct 
impact of the collapse of Lehmans, one of the world’s largest investment 
banks, has served to highlight significant concerns about how certain 
investment products have been sold to members of the public in Hong 
Kong…[T]he collapse of Lehmans resulted in the early termination of a 
number of products it had arranged and which had been sold to the Hong 
Kong public, resulting in significant losses for investors. Over 20,000 
complaints were received from investors in Lehman products nearly all of 
which contained allegations of mis-selling…[T]his paper proposes 
enhancements to the regulation of the sale of retail products in response to 
issues highlighted by the early termination of Lehman products.77 
And added that, 
While the resilience that our financial infrastructure has shown during the 
financial crisis has attracted positive comments, the Minibonds incident has 
exposed issues in connection with the sale of investment products and has 
negatively impacted on the reputation of our market both locally and 
                                                        
76  See Hong Kong Monetary Authority, ‘Report of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority on 
Issues Concerning the Distribution of Structured products Connected to Lehman Group Companies’, 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/new/lehman/lehman_report.pdf> at 21st September 2009, and 
Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Issues raised by the Lehmans Minibonds crisis: Report to the 
Financial Secretary, December 2008’  
<http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/general/general/lehman/Review%20Report/Review%20Report.pdf> at 
22nd September 2009. 
77  Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Consultation Paper on Proposals to Enhance Protection 
of the Investing Public; September 2009’ 4 
<https://www.sfc.hk/sfcConsultation/EN/sfcConsultMainServlet?name=publicinvestorprotection>  at 
22 January 2010. 
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internationally. In order to restore the trust and confidence in our market we 
believe that the Government, the regulators and the industry need to 
collectively demonstrate that the lessons of this incident have been learned and 
that appropriate action has been taken.78  
Evidently, the SFC recognised the importance of the problem and the urgency for 
reforms, but they were cautious to use the label “mis-selling” rather than 
“misrepresentation” which indicates more explicit legal liability. But there was no 
discussions about amending the MO or UCO. 
 
The main consultation document is 93 pages long with a total of 32 questions posed to 
the public for feedback. Much of the proposals contained in the document are 
interconnected. The crux of the proposals is to divide the regulatory recommendations 
into three key stages: ‘pre-sale’, ‘sale’ and ‘post-sale’.79 More importantly, the 
proposals according to SFC, ‘[i]s premised on Hong Kong continuing to adopt a 
largely “disclosure-based approached”…’80 Therefore in the following this paper shall 
examine the proposed disclosure related measures, which is also relevant in 
addressing the key issue of misrepresentation and misleading representation 
highlighted in the above discussions.81 
  
Under key proposals in the code on Unlisted Structured Products, Unit Trust and 
Mutual Funds and Investment-linked Assurance Scheme, the SFC proposed that the 
PKFS are to be included with the offering document. And instead of adopting a rigid 
and prescriptive set of rules, it prefers to lay down the principles of providing 
                                                        
78  Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Consultation Paper on Proposals to Enhance Protection 
of the Investing Public; September 2009’ 5 
<https://www.sfc.hk/sfcConsultation/EN/sfcConsultMainServlet?name=publicinvestorprotection>  at 
22 January 2010. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Consultation Paper on Proposals to Enhance Protection 
of the Investing Public; September 2009’ 8 
<https://www.sfc.hk/sfcConsultation/EN/sfcConsultMainServlet?name=publicinvestorprotection>  at 
22 January 2010. 
81  Note there is a distinction between misrepresent and mislead. The former refers to an untrue 
statement of fact, the latter statements that leads people to believe in something untrue, half truths, or 
gives an impression that is false. See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Henry Kaye 
and National Investment Institute Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1363 and ACCC v Emerald Ocean Distributors 
Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1703. 
  24
guidance on disclosure standards.82 Amongst the list of items to disclose are the 
characteristics, nature, and features of the product, as well as the risk of the 
products.83 Whilst this is best practice drawn from US, UK and Australia, the 
implementation of these ideas can be quite challenging. For the reason that some 
products like MBs is nearly impossible to explain in a short document in layperson 
terms. The Lehman Brothers MBs prospectus worked out to be close to a hundred 
pages. More problematical is the explanation of risk in layperson terms, especially 
when it involves complicated statistical and econometric forecast.  
 
By having a laundry list of disclosure items by itself is not a cure of the ills learnt 
from the Lehman Brothers MBs crisis in Hong Kong. Often how to put across 
complex information of financial products and their risk is not as simple as one would 
presume. This does not however suggest disclosure is ineffective or unworkable. 
Attention should be given to ensure the information contained in a PKFS is drafted in 
such a way that layperson and the average investor can comprehend. And it would be 
a mistake to assume or propose standardisation (which is SFC is also proposing) of 
offer documents and advertisements is the solution to this multifaceted problem.84  
 
What the government consultant paper did not discuss or even contemplate is the 
issue of whether the prevailing statutes need to be amended. From the previous 
section, this article has highlighted certain gaps in CO, MO and UCO that needs to be 
addressed. One possible integrated solution is to amend the law to ensure the PKFS is 
subjected to an amended MO and UCO so that the contents of that the document 
would not misrepresent, misled, or deceive investors along the lines of Australian 
laws. 
 
                                                        
82  Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Consultation Paper on Proposals to Enhance Protection 
of the Investing Public; September 2009’ 26, 48 and 56 
<https://www.sfc.hk/sfcConsultation/EN/sfcConsultMainServlet?name=publicinvestorprotection>  at 
22 January 2010. 
83  Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Consultation Paper on Proposals to Enhance Protection 
of the Investing Public; September 2009’ 27, 48, and 56 
<https://www.sfc.hk/sfcConsultation/EN/sfcConsultMainServlet?name=publicinvestorprotection>  at 
22 January 2010. 
84  See Securities and Futures Commission, ‘Consultation Paper on Proposals to Enhance 
Protection of the Investing Public; September 2009’ 8 
<https://www.sfc.hk/sfcConsultation/EN/sfcConsultMainServlet?name=publicinvestorprotection>  at 
22 January 2010. 
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For example, a recent newspaper advertisement in Hong Kong uses such catchphrase: 
“introducing the world’s first crash-tested [emphasis added] fund” in bold. Does this 
imply it has a long track record, or it has undergone some kind of econometric 
testing? Or it is merely a slang used to describe something else? A disclaimer was 
added on a separate section of this advertisement in fine prints stating, “the product is 
relatively new [emphasis added] and it is not possible to predict its future 
development and risks”. Whilst this statement is meant for potential investors, does 
the words in bold compared to the fine prints create more confusion or clarity for 
laypersons?  
 
Australian courts had formed the view that context is important to the characterisation 
of representation, as well as how the disclaimers and qualifications are being 
presented. 85 The disproportion between representation and qualifying statements 
might be considered misleading and deceptive conduct.86 This paper therefore 
proposes that Hong Kong could look at Australian as a reference point for reforms. 
Australia has taken more prescriptive and detailed rules with sections 1041H and 
991A(1) in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (CA) and sections 12DA and 12CA(1) of 
the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASICA). 
These statutes widen the concept of misrepresentation under the classification of 
“misleading and deceptive conduct” and refined the notion of “unconscionability” in 
the context of financial product and services.87 In addition, unlike MO, section 1041H 
of CA and 12CA(1) of ASICA makes no distinction between mere puffs and 
misleading and deceptive conducts.88 As for unconscionability, section 12CA(1) of 
ASICA differs from section 6 of UCO by making clear references to financial service 
providers. Hence, amendments to the MO to broaden the scope of misrepresentation 
to include misleading and deceptive conducts along the lines of the Australian 
                                                        
85   Gail Perason, p. 234 
86   Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Ltd v Cassidy [2003] FCAFC 289 per Stone J at 41. 
87   It is worthy to note that sections 1041H of CA and 12DA of ASICA were drawn from section 
52 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), and 991A(1) of CA, and 12CA(1) of the 
ASICA mimicked obligations in sections 51AA, 51AB, and 51AC of the TPA. See Gail Pearson, 
Financial Services Law and Compliance in Australia (2009) 217. Therefore the meanings of these 
provisions are borrowed from TPA. For example, the court considers the ordinary meaning of the 
words “mislead” and “deceive” shares the common element of “lead to error”. Further, the section also 
covers the concept of “likely to mislead or deceive”. The words “likely to” add value to the section in 
the sense that it is unnecessary to prove that the conduct in question actually deceived or misled 
anyone. See Gibbs CJ in Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149CLR 
191; 56 ALJR 715; 42 ALR 1; ATPR 40‐307 at 198(CLR). 
88   Therefore the meanings of these provisions are borrowed from TPA 
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provisions could broaden the narrow confines of misrepresentation. Furthermore, 
making the UCO applicable to financial services could better account for certain 
vulnerabilities that are specific to retail investors. 
7 Conclusions 
The article has attempted to analyse the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers MBs and 
its impact on its investors. Despite the fact that the tragic losses of tens of thousands 
of investors and the public outrage occurred in Hong Kong, the banks and financial 
institutions were unpunished by the law. As a matter of fact, this had resulted in a 
wider impact on the Hong Kong international financial hub. Clearly, urgent regulatory 
reforms are needed as an attempt to rebuild the public’s confidence in Hong Kong’s 
financial sector, as well as the island’s international reputation. 
 
This is however not as straightforward as merely introducing new laws or codes. 
Financial innovation can be both a blessing and a curse, because without it, there 
might be liquidity problems which would impede economic growth, as well as 
removes the availability of alternative investment products offered to individuals and 
corporations. This is unfortunately never an easy task. Even an attempt in this paper 
to explain what MBs are had been plagued with problems as they are complicated 
financial innovation not easily conveyed in simple terms. 
 
Hong Kong alleged to be one of the free economies in the world. The government has 
a long tradition of the positive non-intervention culture in regulating its economic 
matters. Thus the government did not impose obsessive regulations on the local banks 
and financial institutions. This requires a consumer or a retail investor to take a 
“buyer beware” approach in their investment decision-making. Naturally, this also 
lead to the fact that Hong Kong does not have a systemic legal environment which 
can safeguard the rights of consumers at large.     
 
Even if the reports in the media regarding the allegations of misrepresentation were 
true, as noted the narrow construction and specificity of the legislations in Hong Kong 
meant that the chances of winning the court-case would be like ‘rolling of the dices’. 
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Whilst there is some successes on the part of the efforts of the SFC and other HK 
government department to help MB investors to negotiate with the local banks and 
financial institutions, the outcomes were that those institutions refunded about 60 to 
70 percent of the original investments.  Nevertheless, this does not signify any legal 
consequence that the wrongdoers would suffer, neither this would establish any 
precedents for the future similar situations.  
 
The reason for the need for governmental intervention in relieving investors is 
perhaps due to the difficulties involve in mounting legal action against the banks and 
financial institutions. Apart from the high cost of litigation, as noted the provisions in 
CO, MO, and UCO are either too narrowly constructed or is difficult for the plaintiff 
to make a case.  
 
The SFC had put forward a set of proposals for public consultation to date. In which 
the underlying rationale was “disclosure based”. Whilst this paper does not reject the 
merits of a disclosure based approach to regulate financial products, it cautions 
against the over reliance of such measures without addressing the finer points in 
fixing the problem – as an old saying goes: “the devil is in the details” in particular 
with regards to misleading and deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct.  
 
In conclusion, this paper acknowledges that regulating the sale of financial products 
requires a balanced approach. On the one hand there needs to be flexibility in how 
each institution or financial investment provider disclosure information specific to 
their products; and on the other hand, there needs to be a clear minimum standard 
backed by statutes to serve as default legal rules. Therefore, the law should be 
amended to ensure the contents of the PKFS will not misrepresent, mislead or deceive 
potential investors, liken the Australian provisions suggested in the above. This is, in 
the authors’ view, fundamental to the success of the SFC proposals.   
 
